Screen Sharing is the macOS feature that lets someone on another computer connect to your Mac, see the desktop, and control it as if they were sitting right in front of it. By default it stays off, and you switch it on in System Settings when you want to reach your own machine from another room or another city. On August 6, Apple released macOS Tahoe 26.6.1, Sequoia 15.7.9, and Sonoma 14.8.9 to close a flaw in that service, tracked as CVE-2026-65400. The service could be talked into treating a connection as logged in when it never was.

Microsoft and Google still have not fixed their part.

Webmail has a problem it has never fully solved. Someone sends you HTML, and that HTML has to be displayed inside a page that also holds your inbox, your buttons and your account. To handle that, webmail runs the message through a sanitizer, which strips or rewrites anything it considers dangerous and hands what is left to the browser. The weak spot sits in that word, considers. A sanitizer has its own reading of the HTML and CSS, the browser has another, and where those two readings differ you get a gap. Some clients go a step further and let the browser parse the message first, then filter what the browser produced. That output can be pushed back into something malicious too.

Hugging Face found the first one itself. It caught the intruder in its production systems, cut the access, and published what it knew on July 16, still not knowing which model was behind it. OpenAI put its own post up five days later. Anthropic and AISI went digging through their own logs after that, and Meta’s incident reached the press through The Information rather than a blog post.

There was no phishing email and nothing suspicious to download. You typed npm install, or your build server did it at three in the morning while you slept, and attacker code ran before the install had finished.

A passkey sells one promise. No password to phish, no shared secret on the website’s server to leak, and a private key that stays with you. Your face or your fingerprint releases it. That part holds. What the marketing skips is that a synced passkey does leave your device, in encrypted form, so Google can copy it to your other devices. This research is about that copy, and it starts the moment something is already running on your computer. Not with administrator rights. As you, in the account you are signed into right now.

The researcher is Håkon Måløy, a Norwegian AI researcher. He worked with Microsoft’s Security Response Center through a coordinated disclosure, handed them the reproduction steps, the videos, and the exact prompts, and waited. Microsoft confirmed the behavior, shipped mitigations, and upgraded the model underneath Copilot. He reproduced the attack anyway, on the newest model available, and then published.

A hardware wallet sells one promise. You keep your key on a small device that never connects to the internet, and there is nothing for an attacker to reach. The device can sit powered off in a safe on another continent. The promise was that the key could not be guessed. People read it as a promise that the key could not be reached. This theft went after the first promise, and it never touched a single device.

His name is Pavitra Jha. He has been using Linux since he was seven and looking for vulnerabilities since he was nine. He works the hard targets: browser engines, Android, Windows, and the Linux kernel, the low-level parts where memory corruption and privilege escalation live. On his site he lists Hall of Fame credits from Google, Oracle, NASA, Philips and MoonPay, and the Indian Book of Records title as the youngest ethical hacker in India. He reached out to me on LinkedIn, said he liked my content, and shared his write-up on these two bugs.

Server-class machines carry a second, smaller computer built onto the motherboard. It has its own processor, its own network port, and its own power, and it runs whether the server is switched on or off. Its job is to let an administrator manage the machine from far away: power it on, reboot it, reinstall it, watch the screen, all without walking into the data center. Different brands give it different names, iLO, iDRAC, or just the IPMI interface, but underneath it is the same part, a baseboard management controller, a BMC.

Researchers at BlackFog pulled a sample apart and mapped the chain from the first click to the final payload. Who builds and sells it is not known. It moves through a website and a Telegram channel, and no researcher has put a name to the person behind it.